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1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n
Aristotle's views on slavery are an embarrassment to those who other
wise hold his philosophy in high regard. To the modem mind they are
morally repugnant. Many find them poorly argued and incompatible with
more fundamental tenets of his system, and they certainly contain at least
apparent inconsistencies. Worst of all, perhaps, is the suspicion that his
theory of slavery is not really philosophy: "II ne fait de doute pour per-
sonne que I'analyse aristotelicienne de I'esclavage-et surtoux les chapi-
tres qu'y consacre le livre I de la Politique - a une function ideologique au
sens marxiste de mot"'. My paper aims to examine this last claim, and in
particular to get clearer about the kinds of evidence which might be of
fered for or against it, and indeed about what the evidence is evidence of.
To my own surprise I conclude that Aristotle's theory is not to any intere
sting extent ideological.I operate with a broadly Marxist conception of an ideology, as (i) a
widely held body of ideas systematically biased towards the real or im
agined interests of a particular sex or social group or class within a so
ciety,' (ii) believed by its adherents not because of rational considerations
which may be offered in its support but as a result either (a) of social cau
sation or (b) of a desire to promote the interests indicated in (i) (or both).'
Or to put it more briefly (if more vaguely) a set of "views, ideas, or beliefs
that are somehow tainted by the social origin or the social interests of
those who held them"! A philosophical belief, on the other hand, I take to
be one which inter alia is held because of the rational considerations
which are offered in its support. Thus I make the key difference between
ideology and philosophy a question of the causation of the beliefs a
thinker holds.' From my formulation it sounds as though the distinction
* P. Pcllegrin, 'La Theorie aristotelicienne d'esclavage: tendances actuelles de I'interpre-
tation', in: Rev. Philosophique (1982), 345-57 (at 350). This paper is the most interesting
statement of an ideological interpretation of Aristotle's theory that I know of.
' Cf. e.g. B. Parekh, Marx's Theory of Ideology, London 1982, ch.2.
' Cf. e.g. J. Elster, Making Sense of Marx. Cambridge 1985, ch.8.
* J. Elster, Karl Marx: a Reader. Cambridge 1986, 299.
' Historians are often content to label a set of ideas ideological on the basis of (i) alone.
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between rational beliefs and those that are the products of social influ
ences or of ulterior motives is an exclusive one, which would no doubt be
a mistake. If it is a mistake, we can expect more or less philosophical ide
ologies, and more or less ideological philosophies.'
Aristotle's theory of slavery perhaps lacks the range or complexity to
count as a "body of ideas", although of course the nexus of theses and
concepts to which it belongs, e.g. those developed in Pol yd as a whole,
clearly does. Nor have I any interest is asking if the theory was "widely
held." What I take as obvious, however, is that in all other respects
Aristotle's theory does satisfy criterion (i) of ideologies. The question I
propose for discussion is: ">^at explains his belief in the theory?". Is it
(e.g. (ii)(a)) one of those "elegantly presented and well-argued theories"
that "rest on certain basic assumptions which ... turn out to be uncritical
reproductions of the most commonplace beliefs of the ordinary members
of (its author's] society or class?"' Is it (cf. (ii) (b)) the work of a partisan
"who chose a side, making a primary commitment to a position and de
fending it with all the weapons of [his] considerable intellectual ar
moury?"* In other words, is Aristotle's account of the relation of master
and slave as natural anything other than an attempt, deliberate (cf. (ii) (b))
or not (cf. (ii)(a)), to articulate an ideological belief, very likely shared
widely among well to do Athenians and Macedonians, that it was right
and proper for most masters to be masters and most slaves (especially bar
barian slaves) to be slaves? Or is it simply the outcome of purely phil
osophical reflection?
To think of Aristotle as the victim or accomplice of ideology in his
political theory might seem odd to the reader who remembers the treat
ment of justice in Book F. That discussion gives grounds for seeing Aris
tot le as himsel f the first th inker ever to have ident ified a set of bel iefs as
an ideology; or at least- to put the point less anachronistically and in a
more appropriately down to earth style - he was the first writer we know of
This is no doubt because where such a body of ideas is widely held in a society, it is gen
erally reasonable to assume that (ii) provides the best explanation of the phenomenon.* Among English-speaking students of ancient Greek philosophy there has been little
discussion of this kind of question. For some pioneering work see G. E. R. Lloyd, Science.
Folklore and Ideology, Cambridge 1983 and M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Min
neapolis 1987, in his introductory chapter. In his commentary on this paper at Friedrichs-
hafen Charles Kahn questioned the viability of a definition of ideology in terms of the
causation of belief. He would prefer to locate our problem within the theory of interpreta
tion, and to "think of ideology as identifying one particular mode of the more general ap
proach that we call biographical interpretation, that is, an interpretation that refers to the
life and experience of the author rather than to the logic of his arguments and the system
atic structure of his thought". I find this a helpful formulation. But I do not think it ex
cludes the possibility of employing the notion of causation within biographical interpreta
tion; and I doubt whether the arguments for an ideological account of Aristotle's theory of
slavery presented in this paper would need much reformulation or revision if we tried to
avoid thinking in terms of causation.
' Parekh, Marx's Theory of Ideology, 216.
* E. M.Wood and N.Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory, Oxford 1978,1.
to combine in his analysis of an intellectual position diagnosis of social
bias (cf. (i)) wit*- a hypothesis about the reason for the bias that includes a
non-cognitive component (cf. (ii)), applying in politics as elsewhere his
maxim: "We must not only state the true view but also explain the false
view" (EN H 14, 1154a22-23). The proponents of democracy wrongly
suppose that justice is nothing but equality, the partisans of oligarchy no
less wrongly assume that it is simply a matter of recognising inequality.
Why do both sides go wrong? Because people are bad judges in their own
case (i. e. interest obtrudes), and because they take a partial notion abso
lutely (precisely the sort of cognitive mechanism Marx saw as characteris
tic of the ideological distorting effects likely to follow from occupying a
particular position in the social nexus): especially for a rich man it is easy
(but mistaken) to think that someone who is superior in (e. g.) wealth is su
perior in everything (Poir9, 1280a7-25).
But if Aristotle is uncommonly percipient in Book F, he may yet be vul
garly blind or partisan in Book A. After all, both parties to the disagree
ment about justice are made up of citizens: "us". What Book A in effect
does is define "them"-slaves, women, middlemen-from "our" vantage-
point. In other words, there is a possible origin-i.e. social motivation-for
bias in the handling of the topics of Book A which has no tendency to
warp the treatment of justice in Book F.
The blindness (cf. (ii) (a)) and parti pris (cf. (ii) (b)) characteristic of ide
ological belief are forms of false consciousness: someone holding such a
belief will typically labour under a delusion or practise insincerity or both.
In prosecuting the enquiry we shall find it useful to employ the category
of false consciousness. But in asking whether Aristotle's theory of slavery
is a product of false consciousness I assume that we shall not be con
cerned to be specific about which kind of falsehood-delusion or insincer
ity-might be in question.
What we shall find more helpful is a distinction suggested by the work
of Raymond Geuss. In his book The Idea of a Critical Theory Geuss points
out that there are different kinds of grounds on which one may attribute
false consciousness to someone. Two of the three he distinguishes are of
interest to us: consciousness may be ideologically false in virtue of some
epistemic properties of the beliefs which are its constituents, or in virtue of
some of its genetic properties.' Epistemic vs. genetic is not a contrast we
can take over without amendment, since (as Geuss's own treatment of the
epistemic category makes clear)" the falsehood in epistemic cases is in the
end a matter of their origin or casual history, at least insofar as it is dis
tinctively ideological. What Geuss's flawed taxonomy reminds us, how
ever, is that, where we suspect a theory of being ideological, there are at
least two different features of it which may give rise to the suspicion:
? R.Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, Cambridge 1981, 13. I have found Geuss's
book much the most penetrating treatment of the concept of ideology I have read.
" The Idea of a Critical Theory, 69 (cf. 14).
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undoubtedly ^ ^^ °ay a reHex of contemporary prejudi«s orbut we may think that it is largely a re outcome of quite differ-that his belief in the justice ^ ould be a case of false con-ent unavowed influents on gonesis of the theory
'"SSorwfmtrn™ »? epiSc status. Geuss ex-
:^rk&ve beliefs and nonnaUve beliefs, are con-
There are three P^ .^P^''Sy^ug^pistemi?le's theory of slavery of exhibiting P suffers from what Marx-false consciousness. " Sgfectf of ideology, viz. ilegitimate objec-ists would regard as the clas . ^  ^ ,,0 master-slave relation to betificatlon and ^ oucm to both parties. In reality this is not
one grounded in nature an . , a projection of the interestsan expression of is I common complaint amongand activities of his fnf is an anomaly within hisscholars that Anstotle s idea of his general theory of
philosophical even internally inconsistent. It seems nothuman psychology. P®5"^ P® . influence on his mind of class in-
unlikely that the anomaly is nhilosophical ratiocination." Third, itterest rather than to flaws in P ^  persons who satisfy Aris-
might be granted and even that slavery is the appropn-toUe's description "f argument will go)" it is a massiveate condition for such P®®®""®- ® ' ^ual world (for Aristotle, the con-error or pretence to u,hat he calls natural slaves. Again the
oX^Txpltrythe assumption is wishful thinking.
11 The Idea of a Critical 13. prima facie be a sign that a doctrine ad-
« For the idea that anomaly of this kmo m y ^  ^
vanced by a philosopher is ideological Nussbaum for pointing out in the discus-I am' grSeful to Jph^Cooper^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  .Hdeology in Ans-
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2. Ar is to t le 's method
It is easy enough to construct a case for the view that, however Aristotle
himself may have thought that he had arrived at his belief in the justice of
slavery, it was really little more than the reflex of ordinary Greek preju
dices. For it seems likely that most unenslaved Greeks felt at ease with the
institution of slav y. In Greek literature down to Aristotle there is pre
cious little evidence of any unease," and it is notorious that Plato felt so
little pressure to justify the institution in the Respublica that, as is apt to
happen where servants are concerned, he barely bothered to acknowledge
the unquestionable presence of slaves in his ideal state." The representa
tion of slaves on painted pottery and in comedy, or again the attitude to
slaves evidenced in Herodotus and Xenophon, makes it almost as likely
that they were usually viewed as inferior, morally, intellectually, physi
cally-whether because they were supposed racially inferior or for what
ever reason (enslavement is not calculated to bring out the best in peo
ple)." Why did unenslaved Greeks hold these views? It is hard to avoid
the hypothesis of ideology, albeit a mostly inarticulate and undebated ide
ology" (contrast the treatment of women): the durability and ubiquity of
the institution in the ancient Mediterranean world will have made it diffi
cult not to conceive it as part of the proper moral fabric of live, especially
for those who had no obvious interest in envisaging any other possibility.
Aristotle makes it clear that his theory of natural slavery is designed to
establish an ethical conclusion: "it is clear, then, that in some cases" some
are free by nature and others slaves: for whom slavery is both beneficial
and just" {Pol A 5, 1255 a 1-3). Is it not likely that this ethical proposition
is something Aristotle accepted precisely because he too shared the gen-
" There are the well-known remarks of Alcidamas: "God left all men free; nature made
no one .a slave" (schol. on Rh. A13,1373 b 18 in: Rabe (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca; Vol. XXI, pars II, Berlin 1894,74); and of Philemon: "Even if someone is a slave,
he has the same flesh; by nature no one was ever bom a slave" (Fr.39 ed. Meineke). They
presumably reflect sophistic theory, no doubt the conventionalism about slavery men
tioned by Aristotle at Pol A 3, 1253b 20-23; i.e. something rather far removed from com
mon moral reflection. A.W.Gouldner {Enter Plato, London 1967, 24-34) presented a
highly a priori argument for the existence of a general disquiet about slavery despite the si
lence of the sources, but does not seem to have convinced the scholarly world of his case.
" See G. Vlastos, 'Does slavery exist in Plato's RepublicT, in his Platonic Studies, Prin
ceton 1973, ch.6. His conclusion is disputed by B.Calvert, 'Slavery in Plato's Republic', in
CQ 37 (1987), 367-72, but I think unconvincingly. Calvert omits discussion of the crucial
passage R. V 469 B-47IC." M.I.Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modem Ideology, London 1980, ch. III. See his illu
minating discussion of Herodotus 4,1-4 (ibid., 118-19 in the Penguin edition, 1983). On
Xenophon Oec. XII18-19 see T.Wiedemann, Greek and Roman Slavery, London 1981,
61.
" It is already a drawback to the line of argument developed in this paragraph that it
has to rely on the unsatisfactory notion of an inarticulate ideology: how could a body of
ideas be inar t icu late?'• In other cases, presumably, enslavement may be contrary to nature: the cases alluded
to at Pol A6,1255b4-5, and discussed at 1255a2I ff.
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eral Greek ideology of slavery, in consequence of the same causes as op
erated on Greeks in general? Why should he have been exempt from their
influence? If he was not, then we should interpret the theory of natural
slavery from which he deduces his ethical proposition not as the funda
mental reason he has for holding the proposition (his acceptance of the
ideology is what really causes him to hold it), but as an attempt to justify a
belief to which he is already committed and had probably unconsciously
absorbed in earliest boyhood. No doubt some elements in the justification
articulate ideas other Greeks would readily have shared (e. g. the notion of
the psychological inferiority of the natural slave), while others (e.g. the
more general notion that all complex systems exhibit hierarchy, 1254 a
24 ff.) are more special to Aristotle although not, or course, lacking in at
traction. The key point, however, is that, while Aristotle derives his ethical
justification of slavery as natural from these ideas, it is not they that ex
plain his belief in the rightness of slavery but a more deep-seated accep
tance of the popular ideology of slavery.
What might Aristotle have said in response to this diagnosis? One fun
damental claim one would expect him to have wanted to make is that he is
a philosopher and as such committed to examining by reason any ques
tion proposed for discussion. The assumption underlying such a response
is that reason is a powerful source of insight-whether by virtue of its
methods or of its scope - independent of common belief and ready to be
critical of it. It is an assumption which itself gained the status of a commu
nis opinio in Greek philosophical tradition from Heraclitus and Parme-
nides to P la to .
But if Aristotle shared it, he did so in such a deliberately qualified sense
that it may well be doubted whether reason, as he envisages and employs
it, can act as a significant counterweight to popular prejudice. The
grounds for doubt are supplied by his famous endoxic method:*' the
method has an elective affinity for ideology.
This thesis can be argued in a more or in a less straightforward version.
The plainer version takes the endoxic method to embody the view (at least
so far as ethics and politics are concerned) that common sense is what ul
timately carries authority: reason can correct and refine it but never dis
place it or depart from it dramatically. It is at any rate very natural to read
the celebrated statement of the endoxic method at ENH 1, 1145 b 2-7 in
this way:
"We must, as in the other cases, set the things that seem to be the case before us and, after
first discussing the difiiculties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the reputable
opinions about these affections [sc. continence, incontinence, etc.] or, failing this, of the
greater number and the most authoritative, for if we both resolve the difficulties and leave
the reputable opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently."
** See the classic discussion by G.E. L.Owen, 'tithenai ta pkainomena', in: S.Mansion
(ed.), Aristotie et les problemes de methode, Louvain 1961, or most recently in: G.E.L.
Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic: collected papers in Greek philosophy, M.Nussbaum
(ed.). London 1986.
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Reputable opinions do not only constitute the starting-points and desti
nation of enquiry. They guide it, as possessing an independent authority
which it is the business of reason to confirm (if it can: we are in the realm
of to dtgini td noAC; not all reputable opinions are authoritative, but that
fact does not undermine the authority of those that are). Of course,
Aristotle does not say here that the reputable opinions we should be at
tending to are mostly common or popular opinions (rather than those of
the cognoscenti). But •-». ethics and politics common opinions are what he
usually has in mind. He is sometimes prepared to argue that common
opinions carry weight because they rest on experience - on what over a
long period of time has been found to work (cf. Pol.BSy 1264 a 1-5, Div.
Somn. 1, 462 b 14-16) as one would expect of a philosopher who lays such
stress on the importance of experience in practical judgement. In fact the
beliefs of the majority on matters of ethics and politics all too often consti
tute ideologies.
In recent years this interpretation of the endoxic method as an elabora
tion of common sense - at best conservative and at worst parochial - has
been called in question by scholars. Barnes has pointed out that "there are
remarkably few propositions which Aristotle cannot, in one way or an
other, include among the initial (paiv6p£va to be considered."" And he
suggests that "the process of 'purification', generously construed, will al
low him still greater scope in assembling" the most authoritative ones. He
c o n c l u d e s :
"The method is not formally vacuous; but it has, in the last analysis, very little content."
Similarly Martha Nussbaum writes:
"The method does not make discoveries, radical departures, or sharp changes of position
impossible, either in science or in ethics. What it does do is to explain to us how any radi
cal or new view must commend itself to our attention; by giving evidence of its superior
ability to integrate and organise features of our lived experience of the world."**
I am not persuaded by these revisionist accounts of the method. Barnes
may be right that Aristotle's formulations of it are potentially elastic; and
there are undoubtedly some texts where reason or argument is put firmly
in the driving seat and the (paivdpteva relegated to provide supporting evi
dence and examples (so notably at EE A6, 1216 b 26-28). But at least
when he wrote EN H 1,1145 b 2-7 Aristotle must have wanted to accord
more weight to common opinion than that.
Whether the endoxic method is conservative or merely elastic it can of
fer little resistance to popular ideology. Either way it fails to provide ade
quate stimulus to question whether what we take to be "our lived experi
ence of the world" (e.g. "our" perception of slaves as inferior) is really
experience, and even if it is, whether that experience might not be a func-
J.Baraes, 'Aristotle and the methods of ethics', in: Rev. Int. Phil. 34 (1980), 490-511
(at 510).*• M.C. Nussbaum, 'Saving Aristotle's appearances', in: M.Schofield and M.C. Nuss
baum (edd.). Language and Logos, Cambridge 1982, 267-93, at 292.
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tion of social circumstances which could and conceivably should be dif
ferent from what they are. The contrast with Plato is striking. Plato ex
pects common beliefs and perceptions to be confused and erroneous, and
claims a secure critical perspective from which to exhibit their deficien
cies. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. In physics it is Plato who
guesses that the elements require a mathematical analysis and are quite
other than what appears. In politics, likewise, Plato is the thinker who
takes a radical view of the polis, from the abolition of the family and the
role of women to the education of rulers. Aristotle in these as in so many
spheres sticks closer to the <paiv6(ieva - as everyone would acknowledge.
Is this not because the endoxic method is either conservative or anodyne?
To be sure, the method accords reason a critical role. But Aristotle's dis
cussions of the method leave that critical function theoretically underde-
scribed and indeed undernourished, so to speak. Is it any surprise that in
practice its radical potential (which on a conservative interpretation of the
method is in principle more limited in any case than Nussbaum would
like) goes largely unrealised?
Tlie endoxic method, then, leaves its practitioners all too prone to suc
cumb to popular ideology.
This truth, however, does nothing to support the view that Aristotle's
theory of slavery is ideology. As Victor Goldschmidt pointed out in an
important article, Aristotle does not follow the canonical method of en-
doxa in his treatment of slavery." In Book A of the Politica Aristotle (1)
announces at the outset that he will pursue what is quite evidently an en
tirely different method: a method of analysis {A 1, 1252 a 17-23); (2) fol
lows this method in his discussions both of slavery and of household man-
agement^^ (3) points out from time to time that he is following it (A 3,
1253 b 1 -8; 8,1256 a 1 -3; cf. .4 5,1254 a 20 ff)Most of the opinions of
others on these topics that he cites in the course of the book he rejects as
erroneous." For example, he refers dismissively to other views on slavery
as ideas "that are nowadays supposed true" {A 3, 1253 b 17—18). It is not
in the least surprising that he shows no sign of using them as authoritative
guides for investigation (which is what on the conservative reading of the
endoxic method endoxa are supposed to be). All he attempts to do in this
connection is to demonstrate with respect to some (not all) of the opinions
he mentions that, with suitable reinterpretation, they can be harmonised
with the account of the matter already established by the method of analy
sis. I suppose that, on an elastic understanding of the endoxic method,
V.Goldschmidt, 'La Theorie aristotelicienne de resclavage et sa methode', in: Zete-sis: Melanges t. de Stiycker (Antwerp 1973), 147-63 (at 149-53).
As is clearly shown for household management in Carlo Natali's paper 'Aristotle et la
chrematistique' in the present volume.
His attack on the issue of whether there are natural slaves is professedly launched not
from endoxa but from argument or theory {t0 X6y^ and the facts {jbt x&v ytvopiven^ {A
5, 1254 a 17-21).** As Natali shows with respect to the discussion of household management.
this demonstration might count as an application of the method. But the
key thing to notice is that it is not the method which guides Aristotle's en
quiry in Book A, but a confirmatory supplement to it. Aristotle himself
was surely clear about the division of labour here, which is the same as in
EN A. where at 8,1098 b 9-11 he bids us consider the question before us
"in the light not only of our conclusion and of the premises of the argu
ment, but also of the things that are said about it.""
Is the method of analysis any more resistant to ideology than the endo
xic method? Potentially so, inasmuch as it involves an immediate appeal
to reason {A 5, 1254 a 20) and to first principles. And if the moral climate
in which Aristotle grew up was unquestioningly complacent about slavery,
his approach to the issue in the Politica shows him well aware that other
thinkers rejected it as unnatural and unjust (this view is one of the ideas
"that are nowadays supposed true": A 3, 1253 b 20-23). There is clearly a
sense in which he treats the question of the morality of slavery as an open
one, to be settled by philosophy.^' Was he self-deceived or insincere in
taking this line? The answer to that must largely depend on how powerful
a piece of philosophical analysis Aristotle's is: the better it is, the more
reason there will be to judge that it is philosophy, not the unavowed but
deep-seated assumptions of his boyhood, which brings him to a belief in
natural slavery. So it is time now to begin consideration of the more sub
stantive arguments for the charge that the theory is ideology, not real phi
losophy.
3. Nature and the projection of class interest
We have learned to expect that ethical and political theories which ap
peal for their premisses to human nature will have created "nature" in the
image of some contingent, historically situated and conditioned view of
man. More particularly, the substitution of nature for history was dia
gnosed by Marx as a specially characteristic device of ideology:
"The ideologist 'justifies' the capitalist society on the ground that it alone is in harmony
with human nature. He justifies hard work and attacks the demand for a relaxed social ex
istence on the ground that scarcity is a natural human predicament. He explains overpopu-
" I am grateful to Jacques Brunschwig, David Charles and Terry Irwin for helpful dis
cussions about the endoxic method. Nothing I say about the method implies disagreement
with the proposition that in Aristotle's view the first principles of philosophy - and so pre
sumably the natural principles from which he derives his theories of slavery and household management - are ultimately arrived at dialectically by consideration of what is
yvo)gifiO)Tegov But it is one thing to agree that Aristotle would proceed towards his
first principles dialectically, and quite another to maintain that that is what he is doing in
Pol. A. He is not: in Pol. A he is arguing/rom first principles.
My argument here is congruent with Finley's view {Democracy Ancient and Modem,
London 1973,66): "In ancient Greece, with its open exploitation of slaves and foreign sub
jects, there would be little scope for ideology in the Marxist sense": or again {Ancient Slav
ery and Modem Ideology, 117): "Ideological openness was facilitated by the nakedness of
the oppression and exploitation: no 'false consciousness' was necessary or possible".
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lation as an 'inherent' tendency in man, and turns 'a social law into a law of nature'. He
presents conflicts between individuals and groups as inherent in human nature and indeed
in nature itself. He presents the socially created differences between men and women as
natural, and argues that it is natural for women to be confined to homes or to less demand
ing jobs. He presents the historically created intellectual, moral and other inequalities be
tween men as part of their 'natural endowment', and turns 'the consequences of society
into the consequences of nature'. He argues that it is natural for social institutions to be
hierarchically organised, for the intellectual skills to be better rewarded than the manual,
and so on. As Marx frequently puts it, the ideologist 'eternalises' or 'deifies' a given social
practice or order, and eliminates history."'*
Perhaps it seems prima facie unlikely that a great philosopher such as
Aristotle could have fallen unwarily into the trap of simply assuming that
what looks right or wrong must be natural or unnatural. Has any philo
sopher thought more or harder about nature? But Book A of the Politica
not only develops the theory of natural slavery, but takes for granted the
naturalness of the subordination of women, and goes on to argue the un-
naturalness of trade as a means of acquisition (in contiust to agriculture,
hunting, and direct exchange): all within the framework of a conception
of the household, and of the polis itself, as natural.^' The longer the book
goes on, the more insistent is the reader's suspicion that what Aristotle is
really elaborating is the ideology of (or an ideology for) the affluent,
slave-owning man of substance whom he sees as the ideal citizen of the
polis. The claim that slavery is not only natural but beneficial to the slave
only reinforces the diagnosis of false consciousness at work. The view that
what is in the interest of a dominant class is in the interests of all is a no
tion even more highly characteristic of ideologies than the appeal to na
t u r e .
The complaint is that in Pol. A Aristotle projects a particular actual
form of society into a general norm. It is a complaint hard to evaluate. On
the one hand, it is an attractive suggestion that the theory of slavery comes
into proper perspective when we look at its context in Pol. A. and see it as
just one item in a highly specific recipe for the good life for actual Greek
"gentlemen". If you were an Athenian citizen of means, who regarded
trade as a matter properly left in the hands of aliens (evidently the stand
ard view)," and considered the management of your own household your
responsibility (hot your wife's, as was often assumed in the fifth cen
tury),** then Pol. A would indeed give you a theoretical justification of
what you already believed right and advantageous - but a justification
which from our vantage point quite lacks the authority Aristotle's appeal
B.Parekh, Marx's Theory of Ideology, 137." See e.g. G.E.R.Lloyd, Science, Folklore and Ideology. Part II, on women; on the
household M.I.Finley, 'Aristotle and Economic Analysis', in: Past and Present 47 (1970),
3-25; S.Campese, 'Polis ed economia in Aristotele', in: D.Lanza and M.Vegetti (edd.),
Aristotele e la crisi della politica. Naples 1977,13-60. All these studies are in different ways
alert to ideological dimensions of Aristotle's treatment of these topics." See Finley's classic discussion (in: Past and Present 47 (1970), 3-25).
" See again Carlo Natali's contribution to this volume.
to nature seems designed to lend it. On the other hand, Aristotle is obvi
ously attempting an intellectual project of universal validity. Its focus is
man in general as social, autonomous agent, organising himself and those
in his society who cannot organise themselves to secure what is needed by
them all for the good life. The ideal Aristotle has in view is not far re
moved in general character from Marx's own vision of the society we will
enjoy when man realises his potential for self-determined action and so
for happiness." Nor is there anything necessarily ideological in thought
about what human nature is capable of, or in the concern to secure a har
mony of the interests of organiser and organised.In short, we can come at Aristotle's views on slaves, women and trade
from two directions: from contemporary Greek reality or from his own
moral philosophy. If we adopt the first approach, an ideological explana
tion of these views seems well-nigh inevitable. But the second approach
allows more scope for argument, and in particular it leaves open the possi
bility that we need a different story for what Aristotle says about slaves
from what he says about women. False consciousness may have eaten its
way unevenly into his thinking on these questions.
The key assumption Aristotle makes is that the grip of women and
slaves on practical reason is such that they need to have their lives organ
ised by others. He devotes very little energy to arguing this in the case of
women. He takes it simply for a fact. And he is mistaken. The obvious rea
son for this male mistake is an inference from the pliableness of many
women reinforced by contemporary social forms: a classic instance of
fa lse consc iousness.
The treatment of slavery is quite different. It occupies the best part of
five chapters of Pol. A. As we have seen, Aristotle begins by acknowledg
ing that it is a controversial subject. And instead of accepting from the
outset any "facts" about slaves, he so far reverses his normal procedure in
scientific enquiry as to discuss first the question: "What is a slave?" before
addressing the issue of whether there are any slaves properly so called.**
When he does address it, he works out his answer on the basis of very gen
eral considerations about the nature of animals in general and humans in
particular. The kernel of his answer-that there are some people better off
being ruled than ruling-is a not unreasonable thesis. Above all, at no stage
in the central argument of Pol. A 4-7 is any use made of an assumption
that most of those who in contemporary Greece were enslaved are natural
slaves (indeed, the implication of ^ 6 is that some were unjustly enslaved-
those who were slaves only in consequence of the fortunes and conven
tions of war). Rather the reverse: Aristotle's theory of natural slavery is at
least potentially a critical theory. A slave owner who pondered it seriously
would have to ask himself: "Is my slave really a natural slave? Or is he too
shrewd and purposeful?".
" See e.g. Stephen Lukes, Marxism and Morality, Oxford 1985, ch.5.
** This point is well made by Goldschmidt, in: Zetesis, 149-53.
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4. Anomaly and inconsistency
Aristotle's theory of natural slavery is presented as an outwork of his
general philosophy of man; it establishes a criterion of who is or is notsuited to slavery against which actual cases of enslavement could be
judged just or unjust; it is therefore not plausibly explained as ideology.So ran the argument of the previous paragraph. But it can be objected that
the theory is in fact inconsistent with Aristotle's general account of manand constitutes an anomaly within his system. If so, it may then be a sign
of false consciousness at work that he advances a positive account of slav
ery at all.The very idea that there could be natural slaves might be thought toconflict with a belief firmly rooted in Aristotle's general philosophy, viz.
that man is an infma species with his own distinctive ess«...:e. His natural
philosophy recognises no such species or sub-species as "ensouled tool",
"^ e conflict comes close to the surface when Aristotle discusses the question whether a master can enjoy friendship with a slave: insofar as he is a
slave, no-for he is merely an ensouled tool; insofar as he is a man, yes-forhe can partake in law and contract, and so justice, and so friendship (EN
^ Aristotle's predilection for answering questions "yes
and no" is often attractive, and he is often illuminating when he reflects
on the different descriptions under which we identify one and the same
Item. Here the illumination is apparent enough, but the bland "yes and
no extremely uncomfortable. On Aristotle's own finding, "slave" and
man must be incompatible designations, for the consequences of apply
ing them to one and the same individual are contradictory. The air of com
promise is quite bogus."Consider also the thesis that slavery is beneficial to the natural slave
i^ stotle believes that slaves resemble women and children in being incapable of running their own or other people's lives: "the slave simply does
not possess the faculty of deliberation [he perceives reason but does not
have it]; the female has it, but in her it lacks authority; the child has it but
undeveloped" (Pol. A 13, 1260a 12-14; cf. A 5, 1254b 22-23). Like womenand children, therefore, they need for their own safety to be ruled Forwomen leadership suffices, but what is right for children is a paternal rule
(analogous to that of a inonarch). The crucial feature of paternal rule isthat Its primary concern is the good of the ruled, not as with slavery theruler's, ^ y is not paternalism equally the right way to treat the childlike
who satisfy Anstotle's description of natural slaves? Is not their psycho
logical condition so similar to children's as to make this the inescapable
conclusion, and certainly the one most in their interests? Aristotle notor-
s^totle IS more wiling to admit a real difficulty in connexion with the question ofthe virtue of slaves at Pol. A 13. 1259 b 21-28: and his solution is more thoughtful. The
S'JJ'oxfo d discussed by R.G.Mulgan. Aristotle's Political
iously takes a different line. Exploitation, not paternalism, is the order of
the day. The childlike are just bodies, sentient tools; they will find more
fulfilment in being used-in living out their function-than otherwise. Once
again the premiss that some people are mere ensouled tools appears to
conflict with more widely based tenets of Aristotle's philosophy, in this
case his human psychology as adumbrated in Book A of the Politico itself.
Once again this premiss is what he requires to sustain a major doctrine
about slavery, viz. that it is in the slave's interest."
The use of the word "childlike" to designate those suited for slavery
may appear to conceal an inconsistency of a different kind: one internal
to the actua l not ion of the natura l s lave. There is much in Ar is to t le 's ac
count of slaves which suggests that they are feeble-minded and brutish.
They do not have reason but merely perceive it (A 5,1254 b 22-23); they
are cut out primarily for physical labour, and indeed for the same sort of
work as domesticated animals do (1254 b 12-34). It is in virtue of just such
features that their enslavement is held to be justifiable (cf. e.g. A 2, 1252 a
30-34). But while this is the picture which emerges from the main argu
ment in ^5 (with ^4 2), other comments made by Aristotle later in Pol. A
point in another direction. A 7, which argues that masters are not masters
in virtue of their possession of a relevant science, concedes that there are
forms of knowledge appropriate both to masters and to slaves. Slaves can
be taught their everyday duties of service, and (1255 b 25-30):
"This kind of instruction might well be extended to cookery and the rest of those kinds of
service. For the tasks of the various slaves differ, some bringing more in the way of esteem,
others being more in the nature of necessities. As the proverb has it: 'slave before slave,
master before master ' " .
A 13 adds that they require a form of virtue to withstand temptations
which might impede performance of their jobs (1260 a 33-36), and conse
quently need not merely instructions but advice or encouragement (more
so than children)-and must not therefore be denied reason (1260 b 5-7).
Slaves such as these sound not in the least feeble-minded, but like the nat
urally slavish Asians (/"U, 1285 a 16-22) who are said to be well-
equipped for thinking and the skills (what they lack is spirit; HI, 1327 b
27-29). It is hard to see why on the premises of A 5 they qualify as natural
slaves at all.
How has Aristotle got himself into this difficulty? It is tempting to
answer: because the ideological roots of his theory could not be concealed
I am obliged to Charles Kahn for forcing me to consider the issue raised in this para
graph, which I had neglected to do in the original version of the paper. My formulation of
the problem is much indebted to N.D.Smith, 'Aristotle's theory of natural slavery*, in
Phoenix 37 (1983), 109-22. The problem is, I think, crucially one about exploitation, not
ownership: are there any humans whom we are justifled in using as tools at will? Aristotle
actually seems to hold that property simply consists in tools whose use one controls (A 4,
1253 b 30 - 1254 a 17). It is worth noting that the idea of treating other humans as tools
need not itself be too troubling: Aristotle is prepared to think of friends in this way (EN A
8,1099 a 33-b 2). But friends are not like slaves at one's entire disposal.
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for long. In its initial presentation the theory may legitimate only very se
lective enslavement-of the feeble-minded. But the fact that Aristotle so
soon slips in intelligent slaves who practise crafts, not just necessary phys
ical taste, shows that its real motivation was to justify the actual institu
tion of slavery as he knew it. This hypothesis also suggests an explanation
of the anomalous presence of the theory within his system: it is developed
because class interest dictates that there should be slaves, not because it
fits well with Aristotle's philosophy.
Yet appeal to ideology is not the only reasonable or intellectually re
spectable way of coping with anomaly and inconsistency. These are phe
nomena not unknown elsewhere in the writings of great philosophers.
And there is at least one other commonly employed strategy for dealing
with them: the exercise of interpretative charity. Perhaps that is what we
should try in the present case, and hope to show either that thes-^ inconsis
tencies are a sign of a fruitful tension within Aristotle's thought or that
carefully considered they turn out not to be inconsistencies after all.
Let us take first the alleged inconsistency in Aristotle's treatment of the
all-important issue of the psychology of the natural slave. There is a diffi
culty in supposing that Aristotle insincerely or self-deludingly forgets later
in Book A an earlier characterisation of natural slaves as essentially fee
ble-minded. The faculty in which they are from the outset declared defi
cient is deliberation or practical reason: the ability "to look ahead in
thought" {A 2, 1252 a 31-32). This-the power of deliberation-is once
more denied them in 13 (1260 a 12). Hence their suitability for slavery:
they need someone else to deliberate on their behalf if they are to survive
(so e.g. A 2, 1252 a 30-31). It is because they can follow deliberative rea
soning in others (A 5, 1254 b 22) that they are accorded reason at the end
of A 13 (1260 b 5-6); which does not conflict with its denial to them at 5,
1254 b 23-for they cannot deliberate themselves. Now this deliberative in
capacity is not for Aristotle incompatible with the intelligent exercise of
skills like cookery (A 7, 1255 b 26) or shoemaking (A 13, 1260 b 2): chil
dren too acquire such skills without thereby achieving the consistency of
purpose and the breadth of reflection needed to look after themselves
properly; and it is the comparison with children that Aristotle dwells on
most in i4 13. It would be at odds with the doctrine that slaves cannot de
liberate to suggest that they might exercise the architectonic skills of farm-
managers or bankers. But Aristotle does not suggest any such thing.
A1 and 5 he certainly gives the impression that brute physical
strength and deliberative incapacity are two sides of a single coin, and to
gether supply the rationale of the slave's symbiotic relation with his mas
ter. This emphasis on the physical is best seen as expository exaggeration,
not unlike the stress put upon habituation of the passions in the initial ac
count of moral virtue in EN B, where in order to distance himself from the
Socratic identification of virtue with knowledge Aristotle notoriously un
derplays the role he himself assigns to rational judgement. Maybe the
childlike adults of Pol. A are usually physically robust, but Aristotle him
self observes that this is often not the case (A 5, 1254 b 32-1255 al). We
should allow him a similar ini to noX6 with regard to the necessary
taste they are fitted to perform: some may be capable of more that the
bare essentials, without significantly altering the general Calibanesque
picture, and without moving into the ranks of those who can deliberate.
Aristotle's conception of the psychology of the childlike adult may
therefore be seen as a reasonably coherent one, accommodating the possi
bility of the intelligent exercise of a range of skills. Is the further claim
that this psychology equips him to be a living tool similarly defensible
within the context of Aristotle's general philosophy of man against the ob
jections we raised? In ^ 13 Aristotle himself formulates an dnogia which
bears directly on the problem. Does the slave have a virtue (e.g. any of the
moral virtues) of greater worth than excellence in service? If yes, how will
slaves differ from the free? If no, that is odd {&tonov - "anomalous", says
the Penguin), for they are men and share in reason (1259 b 21-28).
The resolution Aristotle offers (1260 a 14-24; 1260 a 33-36) in effect de
nies the assumption which the dnoQia comes close to enunciating, viz.
that the categories of living tool and human being are incompatible. The
excellence of a slave is certainly the fine service of a living tool. But such
service will require the exercise of the moral virtues only humans can pos
sess: courage, temperance and the rest. For without a little of them the
slave may fail in his function. He does not need (for example) the admin
istrative courage of a general or statesman, but "subordinate courage"
{67rrigeTtHi] agstfi) to cope with the dangers of the job."
So "living tool" is not the name for a distinct species (or pseudo-spe
cies) of animal. It is a way of describing a perfectly recognisable sort of
human being, so as to pick out what Aristotle regards as the distinguishing
mode of activity appropriate to their childlike, but often physically robust,
c o n d i t i o n .
We might still believe that the correct way to treat such persons is pater
nalism, not exploitation. It is not clear that we would be right. At any rate
Aristotle supplies some materials for an argument to the contrary. The
crucial difference, he might say, between a child and a natural slave is that
the child can and normally will acquire strategic purposes of his own
(even if at present his capacity for deliberation is very undeveloped), but
the natural slave never can. This difference may reasonably suggest a dif
ference in rule. We should treat children in such a way as to encourage
their development as independent agents. The childlike are best off if pre
scribed a sensible programme of short-term activities which serve our own
" Mulgan [Aristotle's Political Theory, 42) observes: "If the slave can be expected to act
virtuously even to this extent, he must be capable of independent action and not confined
to blind obedience to his master's orders". He seems to think this is inconsistent with Aris
totle's view of what a slave is. But we see no incompatibility in recognising capacities in a
sheep-dog for independent action in its work with the sheep, while at the same time hold
ing that its function in life is to help its master herd sheep (without itself possessing any
sort of strategic deliberative powers).
1 6 M a l c o l m S c h o fl e l d Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle's Theory of Slavery 17
purposes (as it might be, cooking the lunch, then hoeing the turnips, and
then sweeping the yard), since they will never be in a position to construct
a programme (or at any rate a satisfying sequence of programmes) of their
own. That way they will share in our life and so have some participation
in a full human life, with the possibility of friendship of a sort (y4 6,1255 b
12-15)" and the attainment of a kind of excellence (with the self-respect
and satisfaction that brings).*® The only obvious alternative is a passive ex
istence punctuated by desultory activity with no particular purposes at all,
as is the fate of many of those we commit to paternalistic institutions (not
noted for the liberalism of their regimes) in contemporary civilised socie
t ies .
But it is one thing to argue that the doctrine of living tools is a defensi
ble piece of Aristotelian philosophy. It is quite another to understand why
Aristotle should have wanted to advance it at all. Until we have a puil-
osophical explanation of that, it will remain very natural to continue to
suspect ideological motivation.
5. Slavery and the argument of the PoUtica
Why does Aristotle include a discussion of slavery in the Politica in the
first place? This question is harder to answer than one might expect. For
example, it is tempting to suppose that Aristotle's main object in Book A
is to establish that the polis is a natural community; that in order to show
this he argues that political life is the fulfilment of a desire for self-suffi
ciency which finds its first expression in the less developed but no less
natural community of the household; and that the need to show that the
household is a natural community is what leads him to present at some
length a vigorous case for the naturalness of one of its two fundamental
component relationships-slavery. (It is then something of a puzzle why
he does not supply more argument for the naturalness of marriage, the
other basic element in the household, especially given the attack on it in
the Respublica.*^) But although Aristotle does not always make the
Aristotle would, of course, need to improve on his account in EN 0 11, II61 b 3-8 of
what makes such friendship-evidently taken to be a form of advantage friendship
- psychologically possible. But there is no reason to think the task impossible or even very
difllcult. What Aristotle has to avoid is the inference: if x is a living tool of y, x is not the
friend of y (which he appears to accept in the Ethics). That should be easy enough, since it
does not look a very plausible inference. Moreover, if life for x involves some rudimentary
form of reason (such that x can say, for example: "y gives me food, shelter and protection
in return for my services"), then we could presumably conclude from the living tool pre
miss that X might be the friend of y. In the Ethics passage Aristotle gives too much weight
to "tool" in constructing his inference; but Pol. A 13 shows that he has seen that he has to
ponder the consequences of "living" (1260 a 33-36).
The treatment of the virtue of slaves in Pol. A \3 would seem to make a revision ne
cessary in Aristotle's claim (ENK 6, l\77 a 8-11) that happiness is not possible for a slave.** He does, of course, attack Plato's theory in B 2-4, but makes surprisingly little play
strategy and organisation of the argument of Book A as explicit as he
might have done, it seems probable that his main preoccupation is not the
naturalness of the polis and its constituent associations-which is a topic
barely mentioned in subsequent parts of the treatise. The issue which ap
pears to dominate his mind right through the book is the question: how
many forms of rule (dgxfh are there? And the urge to reply : "not just one
but several" is the mainspring of the argument.^®
This problem about rule is raised right at the beginning of Book A, in
ch.l (1252a 7-16):
"It is an error to suppose, as some do, that the roles of a political leader, of a king, of a
householder and of a master of slaves are the same, on the ground that they differ not in
kind but only in the numbers they rule. For example, they think someone who rules a few
is a master, someone who rules more, a householder, and someone who rules still more a
political leader or a king, as if there were no difference between a large household and asmall polis. As to the difference between a political leader and a king, they suppose that
when someone is in personal control, he is a king, but when he takes his turn at ruling and
being ruled according to the principles of the science they have been specifying, he is a
political leader. But these views are false."*'
The author of the error is not named, but Aristotle's immediate target is
clearly a passage in Plato's Politicus (258 Eff.) which asserts the identities
Aristotle denies. What lies behind Plato's thesis is the idea that ruling is
essentially a form of knowledge or science (imoTfjpTj)^  and he takes the
characteristic Socratic and Platonic view that whether you rule as a king
or as a politician, it is one and the same science that you should practice:
so despite obvious differences of scale (house vs. city) or constitutional
system (monarchy vs. a political form of government) it is one and thesame man-the expert in ruling-who is in every case the proper person to
exercise rule. Aristotle does not make it clear in A 1 what he most objects
to in Plato's account, although later in the book (A 3, 1253 b ISff.; A 7,
1255 b 20 ff.) he is contemptuous of the idea that being a master is essen
tially a matter of science at all-it rather consists in a superiority of powers
(and pre-eminence in excellence or virtue, incidentally, is probably whathe would say was the key feature which distinguishes or should distin
guish a king from a politician). He does suggest immediately, however,
that the inadequacy of Plato's position follows (ydg: 1252 a 9) from the in
itial characterisation of the polis as the most important kind of commu-
with the naturalness of marriage there. He has more to say on the subject at EN 0 12,
1 1 6 2 a 1 6 - 3 3 . ^ ^« My argument for this interpretation has much in common with that developed in C.
Natali, *La struttura unitaria del libro I delta 'Politica' di Aristotele, in: Polis 3.1
(1979-80), 2-18. H.Kelsen has the main point, although distorted by his preoccupationwith monarchy: see 'Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian Policy', in: J. Barnes et al. (edd.).
Articles on Aristotle vol.11, London 1977,170-94, at 172-5. He well says: "The whole presentation of the slave problem in this first book of the Politics is rather of a political than of
an economic charac ter " .*' I adapt the revised Penguin translation (T.A.Sinclair, revised by T.J.Saunders, Har-
mondsworth 1981).
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nity, which encompasses all others. The fact of its inadequacy, he goes on
(1252 a 17-23), will become plain if one analyses the polis into its ele
ments. Then we shall see why the roles he has introduced into the discus
sion differ from each other, and perhaps achieve some expert understand
ing with respect to each of them. The job of analysis is duly undertaken in
ch.2, where Aristotle develops his argument for natural growth of the po
l i s f rom the househo ld .
That argument, therefore, is launched with a view to refuting Plato's un
itarian conception of rule. How it accomplishes this purpose is not spelled
out by Aristotle. But the moral does not need much teasing out. The rule
of a master is a primitive form of rule, as kingship is the primitive form of
government in a state, and it is to be contrasted with what is appropriate
to the perfected community of the polis; the rule of a master is concerned
only with subsistence, politics with the good life. These differences do not
in themselves formally disprove Plato's identity thesis. Aristotle must sup
pose that they are so massive as to make it very implausible.
When he turns to give extended treatment to slavery, he stresses his in
terest in it as a system of "necessary use" or "essential service", and also
the need to achieve a better understanding of it than is supplied by the
Platonic identity thesis {A 3,1253 b 14-20). In A 5, his argument that there
is such a thing as natural slavery, he first claims that there is in animals
something (the soul) whose nature is to rule and something (the body)
whose nature is to be ruled (1254 a 28-36). From this he moves straight to
the proposition that we can see already in animals the rule of a master and
political rule-and see that they are different: the soul is master of the
body, but reason exercises political or kingly rule over desire (1254b 2-6).
Again, after he has completed his statement of the theory of natural slav
ery and discussed alternative views, he proposes that it is now evident that
the rule of master and political rule are not the same. The one is exercised
as a monarchy (cf. A 2, 1252 b 19-24) over natural slaves, the other is gov
ernment of those naturally free and equal {A 7, 1255 b 16-20). Nor is the
rule of a master a matter of science (contrast political rule [EN A 2\ K 9]):
someone is a master in virtue of being a person of a certain sort, not be
cause he has a certain kind of skill (Pol. A 7, 1255 b 20 ff.). The digression
on acquisition then intervenes. On his return to discussion of the proper
functions of household management in A 12 and 13 it is once again the
difference between forms of rule which engrosses Aristotle. In particular,
A 13 is a sustained exploration of the sorts of moral excellence that are
within the reach of those whose nature i t is to be ruled in accordance with
one or o ther o f the d i f fe rent fo rms o f ru le ident ified in the examinat ion o f
t h e h o u s e h o l d .
In A 12 Aristotle begins by reminding us of the three "parts" of the
household: master and slave, husband and wife, father and children (cf. A
3, 1253 b 4-12). The job of household management is to exercise the dif
ferent sorts of rule appropriate to each of these different relationships-it
is not just a matter of directing the slaves: the householder has to rule free
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persons, his wife and children, as well (1259 a 37-40). The rest of the chap
ter is devoted to substantiating the thesis that rule over a wife is differeiit
from rule over children. In the one case (wives) the political analogy is
political rule, in the other (children) it is kingship, for wives need leader
ship like one's peers, whereas children are junior and not yet fully devel
oped (1259 a 40-b 4). What one might have expected, given the claim of A2 that the polis grows naturally from the household, is some attempt to ex
ploit the political analogy in service of that claim, particularly since else
where Aristotle makes a great deal of the parallels in the structure of au
thority in the household and in the polis. Both Ethics take the same line
(EE H 9, 1241b 27ff.; cf. EN 0 10, 1160b 23-1161 a 9):
"All forms of constitution exist together in the household, both the correct forms and the
deviations (for the same thing is found in constitutions as in the case of musical
modes)-paternal authority being royal, the relationship of man and wife aristocratic, thatof brothers a republic, while the deviation-forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy and
democracy; and there are therefore as many varieties of justice"^ .
And both suggest that the household already contains the blueprint or
even the seeds of political forms of organisation: "resemblances to these
-indeed, a sort of pattern of them-can also be found in households" (EN
0 10,1160b 23); "hence in the household are first found the origins and
springs of ... political organisation" (EE H 10, 1242a 40). This style of
thought would have well suited the argument of A 2. But Anstotle is ap
parently not interested in pressing his argument about the household in
that direction. My guess is that he has come to feel the schematic analysis
of the Ethics texts too artificial, and too concerned to interpret the house
hold in terms of the polis; and he has of course in a sense located the
seeds of the different forms of rule elsewhere-in the psychological struc
ture of the individual (Pol. A 5, 1254b 2-23; A 13, 1260a 9-14). In any
event what we can discern in Pol. A 12 and 13 is a greater preoccupation
than is perceptible in the Ethics with the different forms of natural rule
found in the household, and with their ethical consequences (EE H 10
had in fact talked as though "natural rule" was a univocal notion [1242 a
34; 1242b 28], effectively equivalent to "paternal rule").
The dissimilarity of the master-slave relation from other forms of rule,
then, and especially from political rule, is the focus of Book A in general
and of the treatment of slavery in particular. Aristotle introduces discus
sion of the master-slave relation at a number of later places in the Politica.
His interest in doing so is once again to distinguish political rule from the
rule of the master. Thus in 4 he argues that political rule is something
one leams by being ruled (like military command), whereas the master
does not need to learn the "necessities" which are the job of the slave,
only how to make use of them (1277 a 25-b 13; cf. A 7, 1255 b 20-35). F 6
holds that the rule of a natural master is essentially concerned with the in
terest of the ruler, only accidentally with that of the ruled, whereas in
« I cite the Loeb translation of H. Rackham (revised edition, 1952).
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politics, like household management, rule is exercised either for the good
of those ruled or for the common interest (1278 b 32-1279 a 21; cf. H 14,
1333 a 3-11). Aristotle indicates that the distinction is one he has fre
quently made in the t^mxeQiHoi Xoyoi: it is not only the Politico that
weaves slavery into this pattern of thinking.
Perhaps the most interesting of all the subsequent appearances of the
theme occurs in H 2 and 3, where it plays a part in the discussion of the
relative claims of the active or political life and a private and inactive life.
The passage needs to be read in its entirety. Suffice to say that Aristotle is
particularly anxious to expose a premiss which he thinks is shared both by
those who reject the political life, even though they have a concern for vir
tue, and by many who admire it, precisely because they have no qualms
about committing injustice. Their common mistake is to suppose as "the
many" do (// 2, 1324 b 32) that the rule of a master (or in this context
despotism) and political rule are one and the same thing, or that all rule is
the rule of masters (2, 1325 a 27 f.). This is what leads the virtuous to stay
out of politics: from their false premiss they infer (and would be right to
infer) the false conclusion that political life is no life for a free man-for
there is nothing impressive in using other people as slaves. It is equally
what attracts many people to politics: they have no compunction about
dominating (or trying to dominate) neighbouring states contrary to justice,
and indeed think domination over others is what brings happiness (H 3,
1325 a 16-27; H 2, 1324 b 1-22).
Aristotle presents this immoral attitude as a popular one (// 2, 1324 b
32 ff.), and of course we are put in mind of Callicles and Thrasymachus
and of what Glaucon and Adeimantus represent as the common view of
justice; or again of the Athenians' line of argument in the Melian dia
logue. Aristotle himself associates it with "all the nations that have the
power to aggrandise themselves"-the Scyths, the Persians, the Thracians,
the Celts (1324 b 9-12) - and above all with the Spartans (1324 b 5-9),
whose whole system of government is geared to war and conquest, and
who do not realise that rule over free men is nobler than despotism and
more connected with virtue {H14,1333 b 5-35). Its popularity is no doubt
one reason why he is so concerned to undermine the equation of domina
tion and political rule which underlies it. Perhaps it also does something
to explain why he gives the attack on Plato's unity thesis such a funda
mental strategic role in Book A Plato's view of all rule as essentially a
single form of knowledge does not necessarily entail immoralist conse
quences. But its obliteration of crucial distinctions is dangerous, for it is
just such dnatSevma that Realpolitik will exploit with a vengeance.
6. Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Except in the context of his preoccupation with the different forms of
rule, Aristotle betrays only a very occasional passing interest in slavery in
the Politico. It is therefore reasonable to expect that this preoccupation
will supply us with a vantage point from which to see in proper perspec
tive the problematical features of his theory.
There have to be distinct forms of rule, according to Aristotle, because
there is a great variety of deliberative capacities among humans. This
makes an equivalent variety appropriate in the kinds of rule exercised
over them. Aristotle thus avoids having to lay down by fiat his prize thesis
that political rule is quite different from despotism and that the one is the
right system for a properly thriving human society, the other illegitimate.
His distinctions are to be objectively grounded in the nature of things-or
rather, of human beings. We modem liberals might have hoped that
within this general intellectual framework he would have concluded:
some forms of mle are natural, but slavery is unnatural. What he is work
ing with, however, is not a bare division (natural - unnatural), but the
richer concept of natural hierarchy. In a hierarchical scheme it was no
doubt very tempting to make slavery not something unnatural but the ex
treme case in a range of cases of natural rule. Certainly it was reasonable
to try to identify a specific form of rule appropriate to the childlike.
Does Aristotle's postulation of a natural basis for the difference be
tween slavery and political mle require him to take any stand on contem
porary slavery? Does he need to ask whether the slaves in the society of
his day were natural slaves? Clearly not. And, of course, he does not ask
the question. The most economical explanation of the fact that he does
not is precisely that it is not a question immediately pertinent to his argu
ment about forms of mle: his concern is with the essential character of the
master-slave relation, not with slavery as it actually was in fourth-century
Greece.^^
Unfortunately that is not all that can and should be said about Aristot
le's view of contemporary slavery. While his argument does not require
him to take a stand on slavery as it actually was in his day, there are points
at which he gratuitously expresses or betrays an unargued attitude to
wards it. The evidence is pretty straightforward. Most Athenian slaves (so
the historians tell us) were "barbarians". And Aristotle seems pretty much
wedded to the racist idea that barbarians (otherwise Asians) are naturally
slavish (A 2, 1252 b 7-9; T14, 1285 a 16-22; H 7, 1327 b 27-29), despite
having some fun at the expense of double-thinking Greeks who justify en
slavement of foreigners by insisting that, although some of them may be
well-bom, they are so "only at home" (A 6, 1255 a 32 ff.). There is no
avoiding the conclusion that more or less unthinkingly Aristotle accepted
that most slaves in his own society were natural slaves. No doubt his as-
One might have expected that the tacit question motivating Aristotle's theory of slav
ery was: "Why is slavery so prevalent everywhere?", and that the doctrine of the natural
slave was offered as the best explanation of that phenomenon; "Because it is natural." (I
am grateful to Julia Annas and Christoph Eucken for pressing this possibility on my atten*
tion.) The argument of section 5, however, supplies not only an alternative motivation but
one that is much better supported in the text.
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sumption is to be explained in ideological tenns, as due ultimately to the
bias we might expect in a slave-owning culture which looks outside its
own borders and ethnic identity for its supply of slaves.^
This is a nasty case of false consciousness. But it does not infect Aristot
le's theory of slavery itself. In working out his theory he does not make the
supposition that he is describing contemporary slavery or even that what
he is saying is applicable to it. The theory does not explicitly or otherwise
pretend to be a theory directly or indirectly concerned with contemporary
slavery. The false consciousness gets to work when Aristotle stops theoris
ing.
There is a sort of insulation of theory from reality in Pol. A. Aristotle
surprisingly does not consider it part of his job as theorist of slavery to
comment on existing practice. So when he does allow himself the luxury
of an opinion, unsurprisingly it turns out to be uncritical. We have here
the same kind of disjunction between thought and practice as is evident in
Aristotle's will, which provides that some of his slaves be given their free
dom (Diogenes Laertius 5, 14-15). It would be unconvincing to suppose
that these were natural slaves. Aristotle simply failed to allow his theory
of ownership to exert any pressure on his own practice while he lived.**
These are human enough failings. They constitute a form of false con
sciousness distinct from those identified by Geuss: a sin of omission
rather than commission, and a familiar version of trahison des clercs.**"
** The acquisition of natural slaves by war is defended as naturally just at Pol. A 8,
1256b 23-26 (of. A 7, 1255b 37-39). Aristotle talks there as though he has in mind cam
paigns-"hunts"-against specifically targeted groups or communities, no doubt "barbar
ian" communities. He seems to rely once again on a racist premiss: e.g. "there are some
forms of community so primitive that the natural incapacity of their members for genuine
deliberation is thereby apparent to a civilised visitor." I am grateful to Geoffrey Lloyd for
drawing attention to the ideological dimensions of this text. Its theme is also the subject of
some interesting remarks by Stephen Clark, 'Slaves and Citizens', in: Philosophy 60 (1985),
27-46, at 32-6 (cf. also his Aristotle's Man, Oxford 1975,106-7), and of a fascinating dis
cussion of a sixteenth century controversy by Anthony Pagden, 'The School of Salamanca'
and the 'Affair of the Indies,' in: History of Universities 1 (1981), 71-112, or more expan
sively in his book The Fall of Natural Man, Cambridge 1982.« It is true that at //10,1330 a 23-33 he recommends that in the best constitution farm
workers will if possible be slaves, and that "it is better to hold out the prospect of freedom
as a prize to all slaves." This latter provision has sometimes been thought to conflict with
his view that slavery is beneficial for the natural slave, and indeed better for him than free
dom. Clearly it does not. All it implies is that natural slaves would usually prefer to be
free. That being so, they are more likely to cooperate and to work hard if promised their
freedom: that is why it is better to hold out the prospect-better for masters. (I owe this in
terpretation of this text to Myles Bumyeat.)** This paper has (I trust) benefited greatly from the discussion at the Symposium. I
have tried to list my main individual debts to symposiasts at the appropriate points in the
argument. I owe a more general debt to Charles Kahn, whose commentary encouraged me
to scrap some parts of the original version while retaining others, and made me see where I
needed to argue a lot harder. Myles Bumyeat kindly read a penultimate draft. The final
Appendix: The argument of Pol. A 6
In A 3,1253 b 20-23 Aristotle gives a brief indication of a view of slav
ery which is the very opposite of his own:
"Others say that it is contrary to nature to rule as master over slave, because the distinction
between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so
that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just."
He refers to this thesis in the same disparaging terms which he uses of
the false Platonic doctrine he has just mentioned (to the effect that being a
master is a sort of science, 1253 b 18-20): it is one of "the things that is
nowadays supposed true" (1253 b 17-18). Does he subsequently discuss
this conventionalist view of slavery?
At the beginning of ch.6 it certainly looks as though he is going to. Ch. 5
has ended with the words: "It is clear, then, that in some cases some are
free by nature and others slaves: for whom slavery is both beneficial and
just" (A 5, 1254 b39 - 1255 a 2). Ch.6 begins with what must surely be a
reference to the conventionalist view: "But it is not difficult to see that
those who say the opposite are in a way correct to do so" (1255 a 3-4). For
the opposite view is presumably that no one is naturally free or slave, and
slavery is accordingly unjust, which is precisely what the conventionalist
o f c h . 3 m a i n t a i n e d .
The next lines of ch.6 (1255 a 4-7) confirm that it is indeed the conven
tionalist position Aristotle has in mind. But they also make it clear that he
is not going to concern himself with the position as it is conceived by its
authors (i.e. by the philosophers referred to at A 3, 1253 b 20-23):
"For to be in slavery and slave are said in two ways. For there is also someone who is a
slave and in slavery xard vdfiov. For the vdfio^ is a sort of agreement in which people say
that things conquered in war belong to the conquerors."
The reference to vopiog makes it impossible not to think of convention
alism. The diagnosis of two senses of "slave," the implication that the
slave by convention is only one sort of slave, and the restriction of conven
tional slavery to a category covering only those taken in war are all signs
that Aristotle has not the least intention of taking conventionalism seri
ously as a quite general account of what the basis of slavery is. In effect he
is saying: "Chapters 4 and 5 showed that conventionalism is false. But we
can extract a useful point from it. Some of those called slaves are slaves
only as a result of the conventions of war; and such persons are unjustly
enslaved." If there were any doubts about this interpretation, the last para
graph of the chapter should allay them (A 6, 1255 b 4-15). Here Aristotle
shifts the focus from what is just to what is beneficial (cf. 1255 a 3), and
concludes that where slavery is natural it is beneficial to both master and
slave, but the opposite if it is based on convention and force.
In the intervening passage (1255 a 7 - b 4), which takes up most of the
versions of sections 4 and 6 have been much influenced by discussion with him. It is more
than usually necessary for the author to take sole responsibility for the outcome.
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space and nearly all of Aristotle's ingenuity in the chapter, we are given
the actual arguments for the proposition that conventional slavery is un
just. Aristotle proceeds by attacking the contrary thesis, that it is just. But
it takes him quite a while to get to the point (at 1255 a 21 ff.), because he is
struck by what is evidently to him a much more interesting thought: that
the premisses people are or would be prepared to appeal to in debating
this issue betray a commitment to the idea that those superior in virtue
should rule and be masters (1255 a 20-21; 1255 a 39 - b l)-as being the
natural thing (1255 a 29-32; cf. 1255 b 1-4).
The train of thought from 1255 a 7-21 is particularly intricate, and inter
pretation is complicated by a textual issue. Aristotle begins by implying
that the vdjiog making slaves of prisoners of war is taken by many to be
something just, and then reports that many of those "versed in the laws,"
on the other hand, reject it (or rather its claim to justice) as "unconstitu
tional," so to speak. Their argument is that it would be a dreadful thing if
all that was enough to make someone a slave (or in general a subject) were
the application of superior force. The reasoning behind this is presumably
that the general body of laws do not recognise seizure by force as a valid
claim to ownership.
There is a similar disagreement, says Aristotle, among philosophers:
TftDv aotp&v. One might expect it to be a disagreement about conventional
or legal slavery, but it is pretty clear that it is a more general dispute about
whether rule based on force is just. (And from 1255 a 17-19 we can iden
tify the two parties to the dispute as Callicles and Thrasymachus.) The
reason for the disagreement, we are told, is a shared premiss which pro
vides an element of overlap between the arguments on the two sides:
"force is not without virtue"-there is something admirable and excellent
and profitable about it. Why does this premiss explain the existence of a
debate on the question? Aristotle does not say. Presumably his thought is:
if there were nothing admirable about force, then everybody would reject
rule based on force as unjust; it is because there is thought to be some
thing good about it that a dispute develops.
Given that both sides agree that "force is not without virtue," it must be
something else that they disagree about. Aristotle identifies this as "only
justice." I think the context suggests that he means to imply "merely jus
tice": these thinkers have a high regard for force and its virtues-but do
not care much about justice. At 1255 a 17-19 it is explained that each de
rives from the shared premiss about force {did toOto) a different conclu
sion about justice. One party (Thrasymachus's: PI., R. I 348 C) considers
justice to be nothing but stupidity,' as standing in the way of exercising
' I accept Ross's Svoia for the MSS. sCvoia at 1255 a 17; H.Richards' e^deia, al
though implausible as a conjecture, has the merit of drawing attention to the Respublica
passage Aristotle must have in mind. Against eCvoia: (1) So far as I know no Greek philo
sopher ever identifles justice with goodwill. (2) If Aristotle intended something weakerthan an identification, he would surely have used a more appropriate locution (like /ri)
the virtue inherent in force, and therefore, no doubt, they would be willing
to say that rule based on force alone is unjust (with the implication: who
in their right mind will be troubled at that?). TTie other party (Callicles':
Gorgias 483 D) retains the positive evaluation associated with the word
"justice," but radically transforms its content: justice simply is the princi
ple that the stronger should rule. The rule of force becomes just by defini
t i o n . ^
Now follows a difficult inei in Aristotle's text {Pol. A 6, 1255 a 19). I
take him to be adducing in conclusion a reason for supposing what has
hitherto been merely asserted, that Callicles' and Thrasymachus' argu
ments do indeed share a premiss, viz. the premiss he has specified:
"Since although these arguments stand quite apart from each other [sc. they do represent
very different views of the justice of rule by force], there is no strength or persuasiveness
[sc. so far as Callicles or Thrasymachus is concerned] in the arguments on the other side,
to the effect that the superior in virtue should not rule or be a master [i.e. the arguments
which in effect deny the shared premiss]."
The disagreement between Callicles and Thrasymachus explored at
1255 a 11-21 turns out to be something of a digression from Aristotle's
main theme, which is the question of the justice of conventional or legal
slavery. It is not only that their dispute is about the broader topic of rule
by force in general, but its grounds are quite different from those Aristotle
seems to indicate in what he says about slavery at 1255 a 6-11. Those who
consider conventional slavery unjust do so because they think it shocking
that people should be enslaved by force: Callicles and Thrasymachus are
agreed that dominating others by force is admirable. Aristotle himself
does not take sides in their controversy, evidently because he finds their
shared premiss repugnant: but he makes it absolutely clear that in the ar-
Svev: 1255 a 15-16). (3) Aristotle elsewhere associates goodwill with friendship, never
mentioning justice (e.g. EN 0 2,1155 b 27 - 1156 a 5; 15, 1166 b 30 - 1167 a 21). He is, of
course, in favour of goodwill, but he docs not think all that much of it: goodwill could be
called "inactive friendship" (1167 a 11). Goldschmidt {Zetesis, 155) cites Democritus Fr.
302 (judged inauthentic by Diels-Kranz): tov Sgxovra SeT... ngdg Si rodg Onore-
TaypivovgeSvoiav. I do not think there is much mileage to be got from this. (4) "Perhaps
Aristotle means that the element of justice here (i.e. in the enforced enslavement) consists
in the eSvota of the stronger, who enslaves the weaker instead of killing him. This moral
superiority gives him a right to be the master." But 1255 a 13-16 give the impression that it
is the use of force itself which is associated with virtue by these thinkers, not restraint in its
use. (5) It is hard to understand why the doctrine that justice is good will should be con
ceived as any sort of consequence of the idea that "force is not without virtue". Newman
(The Politics of Aristotle vol.11, Oxford 1887, 156) interprets thus: "One side argues from
this, that, force being accompanied by virtue, and virtue attracting goodwill between mas
ter and slave, slavery is just only where there is good will between master and slave, and
that consequently the indiscriminate enslavement of those conquered in war is unjust".
This makes the doctrine about goodwill entirely independent of the premiss about force
(although Newman accepts that Std toOto (1255 a 17) refers to that premiss); nor is the
conclusion about the conditions of justice for slavery in any way a consequence of the pre
miss.
* Cf. D.J.Furley, 'Antiphon's case against justice' in: G.B. Kerferd (ed.). The Sophists
and their Legacy, Wiesbaden 1981, 81-2.
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Malcolm's stimulating discussion of the issue of ideology obliges us to
consider anew the connections between Aristotle's theory of slavery and
the rest of his political philosophy. I think Malcolm is right to take the
question of ideology so seriously here, where we are dealing with the most
embarrassing stretch of argument in the whole corpus. I refer briefly to
what seem to me the most positive contributions of Malcolm's paper, and
then discuss some points of disagreement.
The central claims of the paper, as I see it, are 1) that the focus of Book
A is not on the naturalness of slavery or the naturalness of the state but on
the more fundamental idea of natural rule, and 2) that Aristotle's major
concern here is to show that natural rule is not a unified concept but one
that takes different forms. Leaving aside for a moment the question of ide
ology, we can agree that the second claim incorporates an important
insight, which connects the theory of Book A in an essential way with
Books A-F. This explains why Aristotle opens Book A with an attack on
the Platonic view that assimilates political rule to despotic, monarchical
and household forms of governance. That is not petty polemic, as I had
supposed, but a clue to the fundamental concern of Book A: how many
d i f fe ren t k inds o f ru le a re there?
There was some difference of opinion among the symposiasts at Fried-
richshafen as to whether the concept of ideology can do honest work in
the history of philosophy. Clearly, the term is often used simply as a
weapon to discredit philosophy that the speaker dislikes. But it is equally
clear in the case of some arguments and theories, for example in support
of racial or sexual inequality, that although they are presented as rational
considerations based upon moral principle or even as scientific conclu
sions from experimental data, they must a/so be seen as politically moti
vated defences of social or political inequalities. This is not a claim about
the psychology of the author so much as a factual observation about the
political tendency, and foreseeable consequences, of such theory and such
research. Not all studies that emphasize differences between groups fall
under this suspicion, only those that tend to justify inequalities of power
and privilege. Now of theories that do lend themselves to such suspicion,
few if any can rival Aristotle's defense of slavery. For here we are given
philosophical grounds that claim to justify the naked exploitation of man
by man. If Aristotle's theory of slavery does not count as a case of ideol
ogy, it is hard to imagine that any seriously argued philosophical doctrine
could ever qualify for this description.
In reply to Malcolm's defence of Aristotle against this charge, I would
begin by challenging the proposed definition of ideology in terms of the
causation of belief. In the first place, such a definition seems inapplicable
to historical texts. Belief is a psychological concept, and Aristotle's psy
chology is not accessible to us. We cannot possibly know how far he was
motivated by a desire (perhaps unconscious) to rationalize the system of
which he and other members of his class were beneficiaries. But there is a
more fundamental objection to this approach to the concept of ideology.
Even in contemporary instances where we can ask someone what he or
she believes, or infer belief from behavior, the notion of causation does
not apply to beliefs in any clearcut way. It is true that, according to a fash
ionable view, beliefs are causes of action; but what are the causes of
beliefl We speak obscurely but inevitably of "influence" here, where it is a
question of explaining someone's intellectual stance. I very much doubt
whether the obscurity that surrounds this idea of intellectual influence can
be elucidated by means of the notion of causality. In introducing the issue
of ideology I would take a quite different tack.
What is at stake here is a problem in the theory of interpretation. How
are we to explain or make sense of a given political doctrine? I suggest
that we think of ideology as identifying one particular mode of the more
general approach that we may call biographical interpretation, that is, an
interpretation that refers to the life and experience of the author rather
than to the logic of his arguments and the systematic structure of his
thought. The general question is: when is it appropriate to interpret a doc
trine in biographical terms rather than in terms of the internal logic and
structure of the text? The more specific question of ideology is: when
should a biographical explanation refer not to the individual features of
an author's experience but rather to the general outlook and interests of
his class, his social position, his gender prejudices, or similar considera
tions that reflect the facts of social power and privilege? As a rough gen
eral answer I suggest the following. An ideological interpretation is
appropriate when the following conditions hold: (I) the doctrine in ques
tion does in fact tend to justify such social interests and (II) the doctrine
exhibits one or more of the three following features: (a) it rests upon
assumptions that seem arbitrary or implausible, (b) it is supported by
unusually bad arguments, and (c) it conflicts with other fundamental prin
ciples held by the same philosopher. The last three conditions (Ila-c)
reflect the failure of a strictly internal, philosophical exegesis and thus
establish the basis for an external, biographical explanation.'
Condition I specifies when an external interpretation qualifies as ideo
logical. Does Aristotle's defence of slavery in fact tend to justify the posi
tion of power and privilege enjoyed not only by slave-owners but by all
free men (and women) in a slave-owning society? I originally thought
there was no need argue this point. But by emphasizing the contrast
between the theory of natural slavery and the facts of contemporary prac
tice, Malcolm now suggests that Aristotle's doctrine "is at least potentially
> This identifles one legitimate function of a biographical interpretation: to account for
the production of bad philosophy by a good philosopher. But I do not mean to imply that
this is the only, or even the chief function of biographical interpretation.
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a critical theory. A slave owner who pondered it seriously would have to
ask himself: *Is my slave really a natural slave? Or is he too shrewd and
purposeful?'" (11). Certainly many contemporary slaves will not have
exhibited the intel lectual deficiencies that characterize Aristot le's natural
slave. And the legitimacy of enslaving captives in war seems to be simi
larly undermined by Aristotle's treatment of this claim in Pol. A 6. So
could it be a mistake after all to regard Aristotle's theory as a justification
of contemporary slavery?
It is true that, since Aristotle insists that slavery based only upon vio
lence or convention is not natural and not advantageous to both parties
(1255b 14-15), he implicitly recognizes that much actual slavery is unjust.
But that is not where the weight of his argument falls. His thesis is a claim
of naturalness as far as the institution is concerned: the master-slave rela
tion represents one form of natural rule. What Aristotle argues for is
neither the justice nor injustice of contemporary practice but the lightness
of the institution. Despite all its qualifications, Aristotle's theory is a
defence of slavery as such, in a theoretical context where that institution
had been brought under attack. Aristotle certainly exercises the philo
sopher's privilege of criticizing what he regards as irrational in contempo
rary thought and practice. But he does not regard the institution of slavery
as irrational. Since the existence of the institution clearly serves the social
and economic interests of the non-slave population, I conclude that condi
tion I is satisfied.
What about conditions II a-c? Does the theory rest on arbitrary
assumptions? Is it supported by strikingly bad arguments? And does it
harmonize with other basic principles in Aristotle's philosophy? Let us
take a look at the text.
Aristotle's basic argument is that whenever a group of people differ
from others "as much as the soul differs from the body and a man from a
beast", then the latter are slaves by nature and "it is both advantageous
and just for them to be slaves" (A 5,1254b 16-20; A 5, 1255 a 1-3). There
are three claims here: (1) Some people are naturally inferior to this extent
(as he says later, they lack the capacity for deliberation); (2) it is just for
them to be ruled by their superior; and (3) it is in their interest to be so
ruled. And there is a further claim made in the definition of the slave as
"living possession", a kind of tool or instrument who belongs "wholly to
the master" (A 2,1253 a 32; A 4,1254 a 10-13); for this implies (4) that the
relationship exists for the sake of the master, and not for the sake of the
slave. (So explicitly later, F 6, 1278 b 35.) Now if we assume for the
moment that (1) is satisfied, that there really are some humans who are by
nature unable to make rational decisions for themselves, we might agree
that (2) and (3) would follow: it would be in their interest (and hence pre
sumably just) for them to be controlled and cared for by others. This is the
kind of argument for paternalism that seems quite plausible in the case of
the feeble-minded or the mentally unstable. But it surely does not follow
that they should be the chattel or tools of their keepers, or that it would be
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in their interest to toil for the sake of others with sound minds. The claim
that it is the slave's interest to belong wholly to the master seems gro
tesque; and Aristotle's argument for it is quite specious (the slave is a part
of the master, and the interest of a part is the same as the interest of the
whole, A 6, 1255 b 10).
The weakness of the argument here only underlines the extraordinary
nature of the assumption: that some humans might lack an essential fea
ture of rationality so that they differ in kind from other humans "as much
as a man differs from a beast". It is hard to state this assumption without
self-contradiction. For Aristotle, the distinctive feature of human kind is
precisely our rationality, our possession of logos, as he has so eloquently
argued in Pol. A 2. The claim now that the natural slave "shares in logosto the extent of perceiving but not possessing it" (A 5,1254b 22) emerges
as an arbitrary thesis, required by his argument but apparently incompati
ble with Aristotle's own theory of human nature.
I conclude that the defence of slavery satisfies all the conditions for ide
ology. It obviously serves a class interest by justifying a system of gross
inequality; it is supported by a painfully bad argument, which takes as its
premise the assumption of a difference in kind among humans that conflicts with one of the fundamental principles of Aristotle's own philoso
phy. The importance of Aristotle's commitment to the defence of institu
tionalized inequality will emerge more clearly if we consider the class
structure for the "best constitution" which he outlines in Book H (chs.
8-9). When we compare this with the class structure of Plato's Respublica,
we see that Aristotle has unified Plato's two upper classes (rulers and sol
diers) and assigned to them the property which Plato reserved for the third
class, the mass of citizens. In Aristotle's scheme this third class, the bulk
of the population, are no longer citizens at all; they are only necessary
conditions, not parts of the noXixeia. In other words Plato's farmers and
artisans have not only been disenfranchised, they have been enslaved:
their labor serves to support the leisure of the ruling class. And in this
Utopian construction Aristotle makes no claim to be concerned with the
interests of the subject population. He considers only how they can best
perform their work and be least likely to revolt {Pol. H 10, 1330a 25-33).
His suggestion there that all slaves should be offered their freedom as a
possible reward does not sit comfortably with a sincere belief in the doc
trine of natural slavery. At the very least, this remark reveals Aristotle's
recognition that even natural slaves cannot always be expected to appre
ciate the advantages of their condition.
Above all, the role played by the subject population in the best constitu
tion shows that Aristotle's political theory involves more than an "occa
sional passing interest in slavery" (20). The institution of slavery is the
foundation on which Aristotle would build the good society.
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